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and implementation by identifying these diverse perspectives, by 
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appraise the upsides and downsides of alternative responses to the 
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1. Introduction 
This report provides an evidence-based analysis of some of the conditions under which the risks posed 
to Kenya by Rift Valley fever (RVF) might be diminished. The analysis derives from an empirical study 
that was a collaboration between the STEPS Centre at the University of Sussex and Centre for African 
Bio-Entrepreneurship (CABE), which is based in Nairobi, Kenya. The analysis was developed by studying 
the knowledge, beliefs and uncertainties about RVF, and about policies and preparations that are in 
place or could be established to respond to the challenges posed by RVF. Rather than just 
concentrating on the extent and limits of scientific knowledge, we sought to ascertain and 
comparatively review the perspectives, knowledge and beliefs about RVF amongst a diverse range of 
relevant stakeholder groups, including nomadic rural pastoralists, sedentary agro-pastoralists, 
government policy-makers, expert advisors and local public officials.   
It is widely assumed that national administrations, such as the Government of Kenya, have important 
responsibilities helping their citizens to cope with threats to their health and livelihoods, including 
those posed by zoonotic infections such as RVF. This discussion is premised on the assumption that 
public policy-making on an issue such as RVF cannot be decided solely by reference to scientific 
considerations; non-scientific considerations are invariably involved. It is nonetheless understandable 
that, when developing policy responses to the challenges of a sporadic zoonotic infection like RVF, 
governments take advice from scientists whose expertise is deemed relevant and indispensable. In this 
context one key issue concerns the question of what information may be in the possession of livestock 
keepers, and the extent to which it does or could effectively contribute to policy deliberations. 
The case of RVF is interesting, in part, because it is a relatively novel disease, with long and irregular 
periods between outbreaks. RVF is a zoonotic infection that is incompletely understood by scientists, 
pastoralists or by policy-makers given its long and varied inter-outbreak intervals and expanding areas 
that are most vulnerable to an outbreak (Britch et al. 2013). The challenges posed by RVF to Kenyans 
are therefore unlike those posed by diseases with which both pastoralists and scientists have long been 
familiar. RVF outbreaks occur at irregular intervals that make it difficult for governments to develop 
and implement clear intervention strategies during periods with no visible RVF activity and to set aside 
resources for responding to outbreaks (Martin et al. 2008). Inter-outbreak periods are understandably 
characterised by declines in levels of awareness and concern, and resources may therefore be re-
allocated to other diseases or more pressing problems. Indeed, given the issues of uncertainty and 
long periods of RVF inactivity, it can be difficult to characterise the extent of preparedness on any 
particular occasion. 
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2. Approach 
Understanding the evolution and characteristics of RVF policy-making in Kenya needs to take account 
of which knowledge claims have been deemed relevant and reliable by farmers, veterinarians, public 
health officials and senior policy-makers. Similarly, in order to understand how policies have been 
developed and implemented it will be important to appreciate which knowledge claims have been 
deemed relevant and reliable by those with responsibility for interpreting and implementing those 
policies. Realizing that emerging and re-emerging diseases such as RVF are not always easy accurately 
to anticipate, there is considerable scope for characterising and learning from, if not ‘best’ response 
practices to other zoonotic diseases then, at least from past outbreaks of RVF. The uneven intervals 
between outbreaks of RVF can lead to loss of institutional and community memories concerning 
responses to, and consequences of, RVF outbreaks so when another outbreak occurs, those affected 
often respond to it as an unanticipated emergency because adequate early warning systems and 
response preparations were not in place. 
The STEPS RVF project had both empirical and normative aims. Empirically, the aim was to understand 
RVF policy-making and implementation, in part by identifying diverse perspectives on how to respond 
to the challenges posed by RVF. It also involved assessing their congruencies and/or incompatibilities 
and estimating the extent of their influence upon policies and practices. The normative aim depended 
on the empirical aim; it involved exploring the conditions under which the diverse understandings are 
most likely to be mutually re-enforcing rather than at cross-purposes, and to appraise the upsides and 
downsides, for the various stakeholders, of alternative possible ways of responding to the challenges 
of RVF. 
The perspectives of groups such as government policy-makers and official veterinarians were initially 
studied by gathering and analysing documents, and subsequently by conducting key informant 
interviews. In relation to pastoralists documents are scarce. Consequently their perspectives were 
identified and characterised predominantly through face-to-face conversations, which involved both 
individuals and focus groups. Those discussion explored some of the differences amongst pastoralists, 
for example as a function of gender, or herd or flock size, and as between nomadic and sedentary 
pastoralists in Ijara and Tana River districts of North Eastern and Coastal regions of Kenya respectively. 
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3. Overview of RVF disease dynamics 
Rift Valley Fever is a disease which is imperfectly understood, in part because it is unfamiliar to many, 
even in Kenya, as outbreaks are intermittent and not accurately predictable. Severe outbreaks are 
provoked by flooding after a protracted period of drought. RVF is a viral zoonotic disease, which can 
affect domestic livestock, wildlife and humans. During periods of drought the infectious pathogen 
resides in, for example, the eggs of flood-water Aedes mosquitoes, specifically Aedes mcinthoshi. The 
Government of Kenya’s 2010 RVF Contingency Plan also suggests that, ‘[…] many mosquito species are 
efficient vector [and that] other biting insects may transmit the virus mechanically […]’ (MLD 2010: 
Section 1.5.2, p. 11). The virus is dispersed and transmitted once floods trigger the emergence and 
reproduction of the insect vectors. Because the climatic conditions that favour the breeding of the 
vectors tend to occur over large areas, outbreaks can occur simultaneously in adjacent countries. RVF 
can then be spread to whichever susceptible hosts they subsequently bite. RVF was first reported in 
Kenyan livestock around 1915, but it was not until 1931 that the virus was identified and isolated 
(Pepin et al. 2010). RVF infections can also be passed from livestock to people if they drink raw milk 
from infected animals, although thorough heating can diminish that risk. Contact with both meat, 
blood and waste products from infected animals can also transmit the virus. Those engaged in 
slaughter, butchery and veterinary occupations can therefore be especially vulnerable during an 
outbreak of RVF, and they need special training and protective equipment if they are to remain safe 
and healthy. 
Though its emergence is intermittent, RVF has become endemic in several sub-Saharan African 
countries. In Kenya it has spread far beyond the Rift Valley region. The Ministry of Health as reported 
that, ‘RVF has been reported in humans and animals in 38 of the 69 districts in the country located in 
6 of the 8 provinces; leaving Western and Nyanza provinces as the only provinces that have never 
reported RVF outbreaks in livestock’ (MOH 2013: 5). 
An RVF risk map of Kenya has been published, and is reproduced below as Figure 1. 
Figure 1: RVF risk map for Kenya 
 
Source: Nanyingi et al. 2014 
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An outbreak in Egypt from 1977 to 1978 was estimated to have infected some 200,000 people, and to 
have killed at least 600 (Gerdes 2004). The last outbreaks were in Eastern Africa in 1997/1998 and 
2006/2007, with the epicentre reported in Northeast Kenya and Southwest Somalia (CDC 1998; CDC 
2007). The deaths of over 400 Kenyans were attributed to an outbreak of RVF in 1998.  
In September 2000 an outbreak was confirmed in Saudi Arabia and the Yemen (Shoemaker et al. 2002).  
The response on the Arabian Peninsula was to assume that RVF had entered their territory in animals 
imported from East Africa and to stipulate that in the event of any future reported outbreaks of RVF 
in Africa, exports of all livestock from the affected countries would be banned until such time as they 
were satisfied that the infection no longer posed a risk to their citizens or livestock.   
Given that the range over which RVF has emerged has recently expanded, RVF is categorised as an 
‘emerging infectious disease’ by the US Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the International Office 
of Epizootics (OIE).  
It is clear from, for example the experience of the 2006–07 outbreak, that local, national and regional 
responses to RVF have so far been inadequate. In particular the International Livestock Research 
Institute (ILRI), in a report produced in collaboration with the Kenyan Department of Veterinary 
Services, argued in 2008 that during the 2006/7 outbreak there had been a, ‘[…] lack of pre-allocated 
emergency funds, particularly within the livestock sector […]’ which greatly delayed responses (ILRI 
and DVS 2008). 
It was around that time that a growing chorus of experts characterised RVF as an important disease 
which should be prioritised for an enhanced policy response (Dijkman et al. 2010). That view was 
consistent with the conclusions from other studies, which have categorised RVF as an important 
disease, infecting a variety of livestock species, especially cattle, sheep, goats and camels in pastoral 
regions (Jost et al. 2010; Munyua et al. 2010). RVF constitutes an important public and livestock health 
problem, causing serious socio-economic harm across regions and borders (WHO 2010). 
For many years RVF was not a high priority for public health and veterinary health policy-makers in 
East African Governments, because it occurred sporadically, and mainly affected pastoralists in 
relatively remote rural areas. More recently, and especially since restrictions on the livestock trade 
with the Middle East were imposed, with adverse consequences for economically-influential parts of 
Kenyan society, the challenges posed by RVF have risen up the Kenyan Government’s policy agenda.  
A conspicuous sign of that higher salience was the publication of the RVF Contingency Plan in April 
2010 by the Ministry of Livestock Development’s Department of Veterinary Services (MLD 2010). That 
document, which will be referred to below as the RVF CP, explained that, ‘The last outbreak in Kenya 
occurred in 2006/2007 and was associated with severe socio-economic consequences that went 
beyond the immediate effects on producers and public health. A total of 158 people died in the 
outbreak, and numerous market actors were severely affected’ (MLD 2010: 4). Rich and Wanyoike 
estimated that the economic costs of the last Kenyan outbreak were some US$32million, including 
costs of livestock deaths, production losses and lost income of pastoralist households and traders due 
to market and slaughter bans (Rich and Wanyoike 2010). 
Official responses to previous RVF outbreaks had been characterised by considerable delays in 
investigating and acknowledging outbreaks, and in providing public advice and implementing effective 
control measures. Some commentators have suggested that, in practice, outbreaks of RVF may not 
come to the notice of senior Kenyan Government officials until the rate of human deaths from RVF 
rises conspicuously, which is typically several weeks after the emergence of RVF in livestock. In the 
2006-7 outbreak for example, human cases of RVF were in effect ‘sentinel’ cases, which brought the 
outbreak to official attention.   
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At the global level, amongst organisations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and OIE,1 
there has been a growing articulation of what is termed a ‘One Health’ (OH) perspective, which is taken 
to mean the desirability and importance of addressing zoonotic diseases as problems that should be 
addressed jointly and collaboratively by public health, veterinary health and wildlife organisations and 
officials. In light of the OH approach, Kenya established the Zoonotic Disease Unit (ZDU), which is a 
collaboration between the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and the Ministry of Public 
Health. 2  The ZDU was formed in 2011 and was charged with responsibility for establishing and 
maintaining active collaboration amongst those responsible for animal, human, and ecosystem health 
to enhance prevention and control of zoonotic diseases (ZDU undated). One question therefore is: to 
what extent can the plans and actions of the Kenyan authorities be characterised in terms of One 
Health?  
  
                                                          
1 Also known as the World Organisation for Animal Health, see http://www.oie.int/ 
2 See http://zdukenya.org/about-zdu/  
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4. Harm and costs: why a government policy response is needed 
Several attempts have been made to identify and estimate the economic and financial costs that arose 
from the 2006–07 Kenyan outbreak. A report prepared by ILRI for US Agency for International 
Development (USAID) concluded that in 2006–07: 
Households bore four categories of losses, a) animal deaths, b) reduced livestock production, 
c) loss of income due to market bans, d) the costs of diagnosis and treatment of livestock and 
contribution to control costs. Abortion and illness of the animal led to reduced annual milk 
production and emaciation of animals to meat losses. 
(ILRI and DVS 2008: 5) 
The costs were high because the pastoralists even had to pay for what little veterinary help was 
available. The RVF Contingency Plan estimated that: 
A total of 158 people died in the outbreak, and numerous market actors were severely affected, 
the financial and economic cost associated with the outbreak was estimated at KSh4 billion 
and KSh2 billion respectively. The disease impacted heavily on the regional and international 
trade in livestock and livestock products. 
(MLD 2010) 
If such losses are not to recur, or even be exceeded, during future outbreaks of RVF, both veterinary 
and public health interventions will be required, which will need to be suitably planned and resourced.  
Indeed as ILRI has argued, unless ‘a national RVF emergency fund has been established and procedures 
and modalities put in place to enable the fund to be made available rapidly in response to 
predetermined criteria’, no response to future outbreak of RVF in Kenya will be effective (ILRI and FAO 
2014). The range of potentially useful veterinary and public health interventions that have been 
proposed include: enhanced disease surveillance and diagnostic activities; mosquito control 
programmes including distribution of mosquito nets and use of insecticides; risk communication and 
awareness creation; as well as livestock vaccination (Amwanyi et al. 2010; Jost et al. 2010). Those RVF 
control options would require considerable investment of financial and human resource if the rapid 
response activities outlined in the RVF Contingency Plan are to occur. (MLD 2010) There is no evidence 
that a decision has been taken to allocate the necessary funds, in practice RVF is not yet a high priority 
for the Kenyan authorities. Even in the context of an emergency, it can be difficult to mobilise the 
required resources.’ 
Given that many nomadic pastoralists endure some of the poorest livelihoods in rural Kenya, and in 
East Africa more generally, the health and economic costs of RVF constitute for them a huge problem. 
Those considerations, individually and even more so in combination, suggest that the communities 
who are vulnerable to RVF could benefit from effective help from the Kenyan Government, especially 
from those with responsibility for veterinary and public health, and those with responsibility for 
ensuring the adequacy and safety of the food supply. 
The need to improve responses to the challenges posed by RVF can, moreover, be understood more 
generally in the context of zoonotic diseases as a class. According to the Kenyan ZDU (a collaboration 
between the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries and the Ministry of Health) RVF is just one 
of six ‘viral haemorrhagic fevers (namely Crimean Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF), Dengue, RVF, 
Yellow fever (YF), Ebola, Marburg), that top the list of 17 types of zoonoses’ (ZDU undated). That 
suggests that RVF could be addressed as part of a broader set of policies for dealing with zoonoses as 
a whole.  
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5. Forecasting outbreaks of RVF 
RVF represents a very difficult challenge for pastoralist and farmers in vulnerable areas, as well as for 
government policy-makers. Eruptions of RVF infectivity are influenced by abrupt changes in the 
weather and by land-use changes that, for example, introduce cattle in areas not previously used for 
livestock farming and that change the distribution of ground and surface water (Bett et al. 2014). The 
changes in weather from drought to flood cannot yet be forecast with sufficient reliability to guide 
rapid preparatory actions.  
Outbreaks of RVF in East Africa have been closely associated with the heavy rainfall that occurs during 
the warm phase of the El Niño phenomenon (Britch et al. 2013). That insight has underpinned the 
development of forecasting models and an early warning system for RVF, using satellite images and 
weather and climate forecasting data. Some RVF early warnings have been generated through a joint 
initiative of the NASA Goddard Space Flight Centre and the US Department of Defence Global Emerging 
Infections Surveillance and Response System (DoD GEIS), which utilises various remotely-sensed data 
to which these organisations have access. Early warning systems, such as those, could be used to guide 
surveillance of RVF in livestock at an early stage of a potential outbreak, enabling authorities to 
implement suitable measures to avert impending epidemics, but only if adequately prepared (WHO 
2007a). The initial warnings could reinforce local climate monitoring and disease surveillance in areas 
known to contain high risks and trigger national and regional response systems to mobilise resources 
and responses (Clements et al. 2006; Clements et al. 2007; ILRI and FAO 2009). 
Both global meteorologists and members of local communities have access to some relevant 
information and understanding, but neither group claim that they can reliably predict when and where 
outbreaks of RVF will emerge. Several climate-based disease prediction models have been developed 
and piloted for various diseases and in different regions; the Normalised Difference Vegetation Index 
(NDVI) is one of such models.3 NDVI can identify vegetated areas and several features of their condition. 
The potential utility in RVF response planning of the NDVI is a consequence of the fact that when water 
is widely available and vegetation increases, the environment is conducive for mosquito breeding and 
consequently the transmission of insect vector-borne diseases. There are however regional and 
localised differences and environmental variables such as changes in weather patterns, which 
complicate the use of disease-prediction models accurately to forecast RVF (Fastring and Griffith 2009). 
Fastring and Griffith argued that for identification of any disease system each of the three components 
of the epidemiological triangle namely the agent, host and environment, are all important and so will 
need to be monitored (Fastring and Griffith 2009). However, for remote sensing and epidemiological 
research the environment is often the most critical component, but it is often not adequately 
addressed. As some authors acknowledge, this implies that, before a model is developed sufficiently 
to be able reliably to predict disease outbreaks can be developed, an association must be found 
between environmental factors and the ecology of the disease agent or host (John 2010). While work 
on those dynamics processes has been conducted, it has yet to be completed or evaluated.  
The 2009 report of a joint FAO-WHO expert consultation on RVF forecasting models acknowledged 
that, ‘RVF warnings are given two months in advance, but six months are needed between the 
forecasting alert and outbreak onset in order to implement preventive measures, including social 
awareness and mass animal vaccination’ (FAO/WHO 2009: 5). 
                                                          
3 See eg http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/MeasuringVegetation/measuring_vegetation_2.php 
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Critics of the adequacy, reliability and utility of early warning models have argued that such models 
(developed mainly by international organisations) are inadequate, especially at a local scale. For 
example Dijkman et al. have argued that:  
[...] the US team behind the RVF early warning system are both physically and culturally distant 
from the actual situation on the ground […] the scientists clearly inhabit a very different world 
to that of the pastoralists of the Horn. The RVF early warning mechanisms are not embedded 
in local, national or regional knowledge networks, nor are they provided directly to the 
pastoralists. Rather, the RVF risk assessments are simply generated on a monthly basis and 
posted on the DoD GEIS website for anyone to use as they wish. 
(Dijkman et al. 2010: 24) 
Those criticisms of the utility of outbreak prediction models are reinforced by other studies, which 
point out that while the forecast model used in 2006/07 provided increased accuracy, it delayed the 
warning until after the apparent onset of the outbreak. As Jost et al. have pointed out, ‘[…] the 
observation by local communities of climatic, entomologic, and clinical events consistent with RVF 
within the known risk-prone areas were more timely and definitive risk indicators than the global early 
warning system in place at the time of the 2006-07 outbreak’ (Jost et al. 2010). Dijkman et al. have 
argued that, ‘It appears that this is an example of a technology seeking an application rather than 
necessarily the most appropriate solution to a problem’ (Dijkman et al. 2010: 24). 
It has not yet been possible to estimate the predictive reliability and/or precision of the weather 
forecasting models and early warning systems for RVF that have been developed. Nor is it yet possible 
to estimate the rates at which they might generate false negatives or false positives (WHO 2009).  
During the 2006/07 outbreak, by the time the model-based RVF warnings were generated and 
distributed, more than a month had passed since pastoralists had reported the first suspected cases in 
their livestock. This implies that even if more reliable forecasts were available, there is relatively little 
that pastoralists can do, at least in the short run in the face of a threatened outbreak, other than try 
to relocate into safer areas. 
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6. Responding to outbreaks of RVF with insecticides 
Towards the end of the 2006/7 outbreak, Kenyan government officials were spraying bodies of water 
suspected of harbouring infected insects with oil-based synthetic pyrethroids, to diminish the spread 
of infectivity (Ogodo 2007). Once the outbreak had ended the Government had to actively manage the 
domestic livestock sector to the extent required to satisfy the authorities in states on the Arabian 
Peninsula that Kenyan herds could reliably be certified as RVF-virus-free (Ogodo 2007).   
Although spraying mosquito breeding sites with larvicides is thought by some entomologists to be an 
effective form of vector control, the tactic can only be applied once specific breeding sites have been 
identified and if the sites are limited in size and location. The relevance of larvicidal sprays to the 
lifestyle of nomadic pastoralists is however problematic. They are often dispersed, remote and slowly 
mobile (Raude and Setbon 2009). In the long run, insecticide spray programmes would need to take 
account of the likelihood that the virus would mutate by becoming resistant to previously utilised 
compounds and formulation. 
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7. Trade and exports 
The current livestock trade regimes, and their associated consumer, public and animal health 
requirements and standards for marketing and export, influence how livestock farming is integrated 
in local, national and international economies (AU-IBAR 2005). In practice, however, the required 
standards for marketing and export seem to have more weight than the other requirements (Aklilu 
and Catley 2009; Dijkman et al. 2010; FAO 2011). Reports of outbreaks of trade-sensitive diseases such 
as RVF have considerable adverse impacts on exports of livestock and meat.   
Livestock provides nomadic pastoralists not just with sources of nourishment, it is also their primary 
source of monetary income. Therefore, in the event of an officially confirmed outbreak of RVF, the 
pastoralists not only lose their access to export markets, domestic movement restrictions inhibit their 
ability to access local domestic markets, and consequently their incomes decline abruptly. These 
considerations must be expected to influence the willingness of at least some pastoralists to report 
their suspicions that an outbreak of RVF might have started. Their costs can also rise. The DVS’s 
Standard Operating Procedures For Quarantine Measures For The Control Of Rift Valley Fever 
Outbreaks states that, ‘The carcasses of all animals dying from disease shall forthwith be either buried, 
without opening them, at the depth of not less than four feet below the surface of the ground or burnt 
to ashes at the expense of the owner’ (DVS 2014b: para 7.5.h). The incentives currently influencing 
their behaviour might lead some of them to rapidly try to sell livestock before an outbreak is officially 
declared, prices collapse and markets closed. 
Large animals, such as cattle and camels (when in good condition), are often sold by East African 
pastoralists into the export trade, which passes through Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia. The animal 
trade between Horn of Africa and Middle East is estimated at about US$1 billion, which directly impacts 
on the livelihood and the food security of affected populations (OIE 2007). Middle Eastern and Arabian 
countries are almost entirely dependent on imported livestock, and consequently meat prices in those 
countries can be notoriously volatile, especially when supplies fail to meet demand 
(HotelierMiddleEast.com 2012; Rahman 2013). 
Kenyan sheep and goats (also known as shoats) are sold and consumed in Kenya and other East African 
countries. There is considerable cross-border intra-African trade in shoats, but little information is 
available on the frequency with which Kenyan shoats are exported from Africa via, for example, Sudan 
or Somalia. The Kenyan town of Garissa has a large auction market for shoats, from where traders 
move them north and east. Most of the cattle that are sold for domestic Kenyan consumption pass 
through livestock markets in Mombasa and Nairobi. Large sedentary herds owned by rich and powerful 
individuals and companies tend to be closer to urban areas, while the nomadic pastoralists’ herds and 
flocks inhabit more remote areas. A parastatal organisation, the Kenyan Meat Commission (KMC), has 
large meat processing plants to serve Nairobi and other urban areas. At the KMC’s slaughter houses, 
officials are supposed to inspect the animals prior to slaughter and to inspect meat before it goes into 
cold-storage. The livestock trade, and its trade routes, imply that RVF is important for many countries 
and farmers, especially as the pathogens can spread beyond the pastoral regions, even into urban 
areas. 
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8. The scope and limits of knowledge of RVF and implications for 
policy-making 
Because of the complexities in the challenges posed by RVF, several of which are reviewed above, 
stereotypical arguments about whether the knowledge claims of scientists should be privileged over 
the beliefs of farmers, or vice versa, are irrelevant. Pastoralists, virologists, veterinarians, 
epidemiologists, meteorologists and public health professionals all possess some understanding of RVF, 
but all can (or should) recognise that their understandings are incomplete and insufficient. The ecology 
of the RVF virus, for example, remains an area characterised by significant uncertainties. 
Field veterinarians are able to recognise the clinical signs of RVF, which they treat as suspect cases, but 
it can be difficult definitely to differentiate RVF from other viral fevers without laboratory testing and 
confirmation. The official declaration of an RVF outbreak in Kenya is only made after confirmation of 
the presence of the infection by the Central Veterinary Laboratory, the Kenya Medical Research 
Institute (KEMRI) or the CDC. Local level laboratories in the rural areas have limited the capacities or 
equipment to test specimens and samples for RVF. According to a laboratory technician at a district 
hospital, ‘At the moment, the district hospitals do not have the rapid diagnostic kits. On several 
occasions, KEMRI has taken samples. The hospital does not have the diagnostic capacity. But if we 
come across suspicious case symptoms related to RVF, we send samples to KEMRI.’ 
Despite the limitations of the various understandings of RVF, it is reasonable that senior policy-makers 
turn to scientific experts for some guidance to help them formulate policies on how to respond to the 
challenges posed by zoonotic diseases such as RVF. The contributions of scientific experts are evident 
in for example the 2009 Decision Support Tool (or DST) and the 2010 RVF Contingency Plan (or RVF CP) 
(ILRI and FAO 2009; MLD 2010). On the other hand, there are several reasons why the information 
provided by scientific experts on its own cannot be sufficient to decide RVF policy, particularly as many 
RVF control options such as active disease surveillance and reporting, vaccination programmes, 
slaughter bans and livestock movement restrictions require pastoralists’ cooperation. Developing a 
plan for responding effectively to the challenges of RVF requires understanding more than virology, 
epidemiology and immunology, it also requires an appreciation of the practical challenges, incentives 
and opportunities with which pastoralists are confronted, as well as the challenges confronting those 
who have responsibility for helping pastoralists, and others, to respond to RVF (see Box 8.1). 
Box 1: Logistical and human resources available to respond to RVF 
Logistical and human resource challenges have long been a major hindrance to RVF response. For 
example, during the last outbreak, there were some 10 nurses deployed by the government to the 
Ijara district. However, the nurses remained in the district only until the outbreak ended. After the 
outbreak, they returned to their original places of work. The same applied to the veterinary side. 
Although some Nairobi-based stakeholders may claim adequate preparedness to deal with another 
outbreak of RVF, the situation on the ground is less reassuring. At the district level, similar 
institutional, infrastructural and logistical challenges remain as those that prevailed in the 2006/07 
RVF outbreak. For example, very few veterinarians are deployed, there are only few nurses in 
district hospitals, with inadequate transport. The Ijara District Veterinary Officer reported that his 
office had just one vehicle, which was not in a road-worthy condition because of a lack of 
maintenance and spare parts. He explained that they had to use donkey carts when transporting 
equipment to areas suspected to contain outbreaks of RVF and other zoonoses. 
 
Despite some knowledge of the epidemiology of RVF, the 2006/07 outbreak caught the Government 
of Kenya poorly prepared and it was unable to restrict the outbreak to the local source (Fyumagwa et 
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al. 2011). The management of future outbreaks may be similarly problematic, given the limited 
investment of resources and the anticipated logistical challenges. 
While a multi-disciplinary team of natural and social scientists have developed a mostly-sensible plan 
for responding effectively to the threat of, or occurrence of, outbreaks of RVF, decisions about the 
resources to invest in implementing that plan remain the domain of government ministries (MLD 2010).  
Ministers need to adjudicate between many competing claims on public resources. They not only have 
to, in effect, rank RVF in relation to other zoonotic infections, but also to rank zoonotic infections 
against other challenges faced by pastoralists, such as food insecurity, drought and conflicts, and the 
needs of pastoralists in relation to other needy groups and stakeholder groups who stake claims for 
official policy support and allocations of resources. RVF policy-making in East African countries such as 
Kenya constitute therefore exercises in policy-making under conditions of uncertainty in both the 
natural and social sciences, as well as problems arising from diverse and contesting interests. 
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9. The extent and limits of science knowledge of RVF and 
technological responses 
A few pioneering virologists have identified and isolated a/the RVF pathogen(s), though as that way of 
putting it implies, there is some debate about whether RVF is one or several varieties of pathogen.  
Infectious disease epidemiologists and ecologists have established, what pastoralists knew, that the 
infection is spread from insectival reservoirs that emerge soon after heavy floods that follow extended 
periods of drought.  
Programmes of scientific work on RVF have established a useful but incomplete knowledge base on 
several technical aspects of RVF including virology, aetiology, vaccines, risk factors, epidemiology, 
socio-economic impacts and surveillance systems. From the previous two Kenyan outbreaks, in 
1997/98 and 2006/07, there was evidence that RVF can present as a distinct clinical condition. The 
characteristic clinical syndromes for RVF, which vary slightly between species, include such common 
symptoms as fever, weakness, discomfort and headaches, combined with pains in multiple large joints, 
as well as nausea, vomiting, and stomach pain, followed by tender and enlarged liver, jaundice and 
delirium (King et al. 2010). 
Those symptoms leave unresolved the question of whether RVF is caused by a single serotype of a 
virus, or whether the pathogen has differentiated, indicating a gap in knowledge about RVF, as posited 
by an Ijara District Veterinary Officer (DVO), 
[…] so far, what we know is that one strain of RVF affects different animal species, which 
exhibit different responses and clinical manifestations. Hence, there is need to carry out more 
research on the possibility of RVF being caused by different strains of viruses, or the possibility 
of the virus mutating in other forms […]. 
(Personal Communication, 5 September 2013) 
Further, the DVO indicated that:  
[…] there is a lot we don’t know about the disease. This disease is a minefield of research 
waiting to be mined. Who knows the full extent of the reservoir of this disease and who knows 
why the disease survives in eggs or mosquito larvae for many years? So much is yet to be 
revealed about this disease. 
(Personal Communication, 5 September 2013) 
Important areas of technological strength concern the identification of the pathogen and methods for 
testing blood or tissue samples from people or animals to confirm or refute provisional diagnoses of 
RVF. The OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals, as of April 2014, referred 
to seven distinct methods that can be used to test for the RVF pathogen (OIE 2013). Several of them 
have been developed into portable Rapid Diagnostic Kits which, while reliable, are not yet cheap.  
Several of the types of tests have rates of false positives and false negatives estimated to be below five 
per cent (LaBeaud et al. 2007). The potentially most relevant technologies for managing the challenges 
from RVF that scientists have yet developed are vaccines.  
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10. RVF vaccinations: a control strategy in animals and 
humans? 
The number and severity of outbreaks of RVF in animals can be diminished, but not prevented, by a 
sustained programme of animal vaccination. So far, effective and sustained RVF vaccination 
programmes have not been implemented in most areas prone to RVF epidemics (Breiman et al. 2010).  
Two main types of RVF vaccines have been developed, both intended for veterinary use. A safe and 
effective vaccine for humans has not yet been developed. One type of vaccine used is a modified live 
attenuated virus while the other type uses an inactivated virus. If the live vaccine is used, only one 
dose is required to provide animals with long-term immunity, but the currently available live viral 
vaccine is known to increase significantly rates of spontaneous abortions when administered to 
pregnant animals (Munyua et al. 2010; LaBeaud et al. 2010; Jost et al. 2010). Administering the 
inactivated viral vaccine does not have that adverse consequence, but multiple doses are required to 
provide sustained protection, but that is difficult to achieve with nomadic herds.  
To be effective and safe at preventing an outbreak of RVF, livestock would need to be immunised 
before any outbreak could emerge. There may be brief intervals between the moment when 
meteorologically and geographically based warnings are issued, indicating that an outbreak is likely 
and where the risks are highest, and the subsequent occasion when cases of RVF start to emerge in 
livestock or humans. Once an outbreak has started animal vaccinations become increasingly 
problematic. Firstly there is a risk that vaccination might intensify the outbreak, and secondly once 
flooding occurs, it is no longer possible to reach the livestock in the most vulnerable areas so 
vaccination would be impractical, even if the technical problems alluded to above could be resolved.   
The WHO explicitly recommends that, ‘Once an outbreak has occurred animal vaccination should NOT 
be implemented’ (WHO 2007b). The WHO explained that if, during mass animal vaccination campaigns, 
animal health workers inadvertently transmitted the virus between animals, through the use of multi-
dose vials and the re-use of needles and syringes, then vaccination would be counter-productive. If 
some of the animals are already infected and viraemic, but not overtly symptomatic, the virus would 
be transmitted amongst the herd, and the outbreak will be amplified (WHO 2007b). Another 
problematic feature of the available vaccines is that, even if stored in stable refrigerated conditions, 
they have a shelf life of only about six months, and there are very few refrigerators in the most 
vulnerable districts.  
According to Ogodo, during the last outbreak of RVF in Kenya in 2007, there was a significant shortfall 
in funding for a programme of vaccinating livestock in vulnerable districts of Kenya. In 2007 Kenya had 
some 1.5 million doses of vaccine, when in practice 3 million doses would have been required to cover 
vulnerable livestock. The Government’s response had been slow, in part because funds designated for 
use during emergencies had already been exhausted dealing with the preceding drought (Ogodo 2007).  
It has not yet been possible to establish the level of stocks of RVF vaccine currently held in Kenya, or 
East Africa more generally. Nonetheless, a draft DVS Standard Operating Procedure For Livestock 
Vaccination Against Rift Valley Fever states that: 
 
Livestock vaccination will be conducted annually in high risk areas. In medium risk areas, 
targeted vaccination will be conducted ahead of predicted outbreaks. Vaccination will also be 
conducted during localised outbreaks in low risk areas and in export animals where the 
importing country specifies. 
(DVS 2014a, Section 1) 
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And that: 
Annual revaccination is recommended and should be carried out at least one month before 
the seasons when outbreaks of the disease are expected’ 
(DVS 2014a: Section 8.3). 
 
In order to ensure effective control of RVF, it is essential to create awareness about the disease 
amongst livestock owners in the high-risk areas, as well as amongst the general public. Before the 
2006/07 RVF outbreak there were low levels of awareness about the importance of vaccination.  
During a focus group discussion with pastoralists in Ijara district, we learnt that pastoralists hold 
diverse views about vaccines against RVF (Personal communication September 2013). One farmer 
explained that he had assumed that vaccinating all his animals would result in the death of some of 
them. Consequently, he separated his healthy animals and drove them into the bush, but left those 
that appeared weak or sick to be vaccinated. Unfortunately, many of those that were not vaccinated 
and were taken to the bush died of RVF, while most of his vaccinated animals survived, despite their 
prior weaknesses. Such experiences have changed the pastoralists’ perception and some are 
consequently more receptive to vaccination in the event of an RVF alert than they were previously.  
Nonetheless, some pastoralists remain resistant to vaccination, especially during dry seasons because 
their livestock are then rather weak and so might be less able to withstand the effect of the vaccine. 
Following the last outbreak, pastoralists in RVF-prone areas have remained alert for, and concerned 
about, RVF. Our discussions with pastoralists indicated that many pastoralists would be willing to 
vaccinate their animals. For example, during a focus group discussion it was said that: 
the pastoralists and village elders were involved in mobilising and moving livestock to central 
places for vaccinations and reporting RVF suspect cases to the veterinary department and the 
human health clinics. After the 2007 RVF outbreak, we learnt that in order to protect ourselves 
during RVF outbreaks, we have to avoid having meat and milk, avoid moving our animals to 
infected areas, vaccinate our animals and isolate sick people. Nowadays, we vaccinate our 
animals when called upon to do so by the veterinary department. 
(Personal communication, Jalish, Ijara) 
Similarly during a discussion in Hara, it was said that:  
[…] for the Government to help protect us against RVF or to control it when it occurs, we 
propose and recommend the following: control of the mosquitoes by using bed nets and 
spraying of the whole house because mosquitoes are more during rains; the veterinary and 
health department should regularly carry out animal vaccinations and advise on the safe time 
to have meat and milk following vaccination. We believe that the same way shifow (Rinderpest) 
was managed through regular vaccination, is the same way RVF could be managed or 
eradicated completely.4 
(Personal communication, Hara) 
                                                          
4 Kenya gained accreditation of ‘freedom from Rinderpest’ in 2009. Some of the achievements of the eradication 
programmes included the operationalisation of active disease surveillance, the use of Community Animal Health 
Workers in difficult terrains and situations, forming epidemiological networks, capacity building for diagnosis and 
inclusion of wildlife in national animal disease surveillance programmes (AU-IBAR 2012). 
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However, little is known about whether the same might be true in other areas with potential for future 
RVF outbreaks but where RVF has not previously emerged. As well as those positive responses to 
vaccination, there have been proposals for increased coordination and collective resource mobilisation 
for vaccination efforts. Both the RVF CP and One Health Strategic Plan recommend action plans for 
various stakeholders, such as government departments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
who have interests in vaccines, and resources for vaccination, before and/or during RVF outbreaks.  
Unfortunately many stakeholders with responsibilities for RVF control, especially those at the 
grassroots-district level, are entirely unaware of policy response documents such as the RVF 
Contingency Plan, the Decision Support Tool or the One Health Strategic Plan. A low level of awareness 
of the policies and documents, and their contents, is likely to hinder their implementation during RVF 
outbreaks. 
Strategies for vaccination initiatives need to be ready to be implemented when there are indicators of 
an RVF outbreak. The Department of Veterinary Services (DVS) is responsible for buying and 
distributing vaccines to DVOs. During vaccination drives, the resources available have never been 
adequate. An Ijara DVO said that:  
When we suspect that there will be heavy rains and floods, we would vaccinate in the risky 
areas. We have 25,000 doses of RVF vaccine in store. These doses are not enough when we 
need to vaccinate all animals. In case of any signs of RVF risk factors, we only vaccinate sheep 
and goats. 
(DVO, Ijara) 
The shortage of vaccines results in hard decisions about which species of animals to target (either small 
or large ruminants) and in which region(s). Many of the local veterinary officers have difficulty 
identifying the patterns of livestock movements, so they are unable to be sure which areas and animals 
to emphasise or avoid. Since the 2006/07 outbreak risk maps have been developed indicating high RVF 
risk areas to avoid vaccinating all the livestock in the country. That should facilitate targeting of 
livestock in high risk areas, thus making better use of the available resources. It remains to be seen 
however how reliable and useful these maps will be. 
Prior to the 2006/07 outbreak of RVF, many pastoralists had low levels of confidence in the safety or 
efficacy of RVF vaccines. Frequently their confidence that the central government and local district 
authorities were always supportive of their interests was also low. Their collective understanding and 
appreciation of the efficacy and safety of RVF vaccines improved when they learnt that vaccinated 
animals, even weaker ones, had higher survival rates than un-vaccinated counterparts. On the other 
hand, pastoralists would be keener on vaccinations if effective formulae could be provided that 
protected their livestock without repeated inoculations and which did not cause pregnant animals to 
miscarry.  
Historically, pastoralists in many parts of Africa have been less than entirely trusting of government 
officials, especially because of their concern that officials might try to restrict or tax their activities. If 
high levels of cooperation between pastoralists and government officials are to be achieved, it would 
be very helpful if pastoralists were provided with greater incentives to cooperate with official plans for 
responding to RVF. For example, if pastoralists draw the attention of officials to an outbreak of RVF, 
and if their suspicions are confirmed by a laboratory, the pastoralists know that the consequences will 
include movement restrictions and closure of both local markets and the export trade. They will bear 
considerable costs. If pastoralists were provided with some form of government-supported livestock 
insurance scheme or compensation for loss of diseased livestock and/or livelihoods, or assistance with 
re-stocking, then governments could be far more confident of high levels of co-operation on the part 
of pastoralists. Pastoralists also complained that in previous outbreaks they never received feedback 
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on the results of the officially-conducted laboratory tests. If procedures were changed to ensure that 
pastoralists routinely received the results of laboratory tests, that would enhance levels of cooperation 
and the pastoralists’ ability accurately to diagnose and differentiate between symptomatically-similar 
infections. 
To date, there are no licensed commercially available vaccines to protect people against RVF. Because 
veterinarians and laboratory workers are especially vulnerable to RVF infection, they have been 
amongst the occupational groups most keen on the development of a safe and effective human 
vaccine. Nonetheless, no such vaccine has yet deemed both safe and effective. As long ago as 2002 an 
FAO report, on how an RVF Contingency Plan could and should be developed claimed that an 
experimental inactivated tissue culture vaccine for human use, manufactured in the USA, may be made 
available for this purpose (FAO 2002). One was then being tested in South Africa, but it has not 
subsequently been deemed acceptable. Breiman et al have argued that the vaccines under 
development in 2010 were unlikely to be licensed for human use, partly because of safety concerns 
but also because their market value to the pharmaceutical enterprises was judged insufficient 
(Breiman et al. 2010). 
Given that no licensed vaccine or anti-viral medication is available for human use, travellers to 
vulnerable areas have been advised always to wear long sleeves and pants and to use insect repellents 
and bed nets to protect against bites from mosquitoes and other blood-sucking insects (Western Cape 
Government undated). People who work with animals in areas where the virus is present should avoid 
exposure to the blood or tissues of potentially infected animals. In the absence of any specific 
treatment and an effective human vaccine, raising awareness of the risk factors of RVF infection as 
well as the protective measures individuals can take to prevent infection or transmission, is the only 
way to reduce human cases of RVF. 
Perspectives on vaccination measures to control of RVF vary amongst Nairobi-based policy makers as 
amongst pastoralist communities. A recent draft document being prepared by the Ministry of Health 
suggested that, ‘Outbreaks of RVF in animals can be prevented by a sustained programme of animal 
vaccination’ (MoH 2013: Section 3, 22). Although the same document acknowledges that, ‘Animal 
immunization must be implemented prior to an outbreak if an epizootic is to be prevented. Once an 
outbreak has occurred animal vaccination should NOT be implemented because there is a high risk of 
intensifying the outbreak’ (MoH 2013: Section 3, 22).   
The suggestion that outbreaks of RVF can be prevented by a sustained programme of vaccination has 
not however been endorsed by a recent document being prepared by ILRI and the UN FAO, under the 
auspices of the USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance. In 2014, the document argued that:  
Vaccination against RVF in the Greater Horn of Africa presents a number of challenges. Indeed 
some experts consider that these are so great that they effectively preclude the use of vaccines 
to prevent/control RVF outbreaks in this region – although they are effectively used in other 
regions where the epidemiology of the disease, environmental conditions and infrastructure 
are different, e.g. southern Africa. 
Most viral vaccines have a shelf-life of 2–4 years, while the interval between RVF outbreaks in 
the Greater Horn tends toward 10 years, although it has been closer to 20 years during some 
inter-epizootic periods. Hard pressed veterinary authorities with many demands on their 
scarce resources are understandably reluctant to maintain vaccine stocks for a disease which 
occurs intermittently and which are likely to expire before they are used. For sound 
commercial reasons the manufacturers also avoid maintaining large stocks which are likely to 
reach their expiry dates before they can be sold. However, the lead time needed by 
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manufacturers to produce new batches of vaccine can be several months. Waiting until an RVF 
outbreak is highly likely or actually occurring will leave too little time for the manufacturers to 
respond. Even if the manufacturers did have adequate vaccine stocks, waiting until the heavy 
rains and flooding have begun means that it is very difficult, often impossible, to transport and 
distribute vaccine in remote areas which often have no all-weather roads.  
One possible way forward is for a regional organization and/or donor(s) to fund a strategic 
regional vaccine stock, which could be rapidly deployed in times of need. This would remove 
the burden from national veterinary authorities to maintain costly vaccine stocks. One option 
would be for the vaccine manufacturer to be paid to maintain a minimum stock of vaccine 
(likely to be tens of millions of doses) at all times. Modelling future requirements for vaccines 
could be a useful approach to help predict the size of the strategic stock required.   
In the longer term, new and improved vaccines, for example ones that have longer shelf-lives, 
may be developed that help overcome this problem, or earlier early warning systems may be 
developed that provide manufacturers with the lead time they require. Meanwhile veterinary 
authorities need to develop clear policies and guidelines for vaccination against RVF and to 
have these in place before the next RVF outbreak. This will entail balancing the cost of 
vaccination, including maintaining strategic stocks, against the periodic risk of an outbreak and 
the associated threat to lives, livelihoods and national economies. 
In determining if and how to use vaccination to prevent or control a forecasted outbreak of 
RVF, this decision support framework encourages an understanding of outbreak risk, the 
identification of zones at highest risk, a realistic estimation of delays caused by logistical 
constraints, and planning for the time needed for vaccinated animals to develop a protective 
immune response…the joint ILRI/GoK DVS participatory assessment of the 2006/7 RVF 
outbreak (ILRI 2008) found that, although an FAO EMPRES early warning was issued in 
November, the earliest cases in livestock occurred in mid-October in North Eastern Province.  
This means that vaccination campaigns would have had to been established by the end of 
September. However, these early outbreak areas had already been subject to heavy rains by 
mid-September that made them inaccessible, pushing the need to have completed the 
vaccination campaigns to early-September. 
(ILRI and FAO 2014)  
Those detailed caveats constitute a problem for the less nuanced perspective set out in the Ministry 
of Health’s draft document. Unless the Ministry of Health can convincingly respond to all those 
complications, it might be prudent for that Ministry to accept the guidance that the ILRI and FAO report 
has provided.   
On the other hand, while ILRI/FAO refer to, ‘[…] a regional organization and/or donor(s) […]’ 
consideration could be given to addressing requests for donor support to countries in the Arabian 
Peninsula that welcome imports of livestock from the Horn of Africa during the lengthy periods when 
no RVF outbreaks are occurring. During outbreaks of RVF, countries in the Arabian Peninsula ban 
imports of livestock from affected areas, which create meat shortages in those countries and raise 
their domestic meat prices. There might be a good case for seeking donor support for vaccination 
programmes from wealthy countries in the Arabian Peninsula, on the grounds that sustained 
vaccinations of vulnerable livestock in East Africa would help stabilise their meat supplies and domestic 
food prices.  
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11. What do both scientists and pastoralists know? 
Pastoralists and scientists agree that RVF is most likely to emerge following long dry periods 
interrupted by rains that are sufficiently heavy to cause flooding. They agree that the infection is 
spread by biting insects especially a particular type of mosquito, which some pastoralists characterise 
as ‘dotted’. Equally, both scientists and pastoralists rank almost similar factors as predisposing risk 
factors for RVF outbreaks, the major ones being prevalence of mosquitoes, heavy rains (or floods), and 
contact with infected animal materials. 
Both the pastoralists and the meteorologists struggle to provide reliable, accurate and precise 
forecasts of when and where RVF outbreaks will occur and, so although official plans of the Kenyan 
authorities are framed in terms of incremental measurers to be implemented when RVF is anticipated, 
those expectations may have wide margins of error. Pastoralists and livestock officials also recognise 
that climate change is provoking large movements of people and livestock, while the Kenyan 
authorities ability to monitor or control livestock movements is weak. If and when outbreaks of RVF 
have been officially confirmed, and movement controls have been introduced, lorry loads of livestock 
travelling by road are far easier to restrict than animals herded on foot and hooves across terrain 
remote from roads and urban settlements, even when crossing district and country borders. Moreover 
roadside controls are less common at night time than during the day, a fact that is well understood by 
livestock traders and transporters.   
An Ijara DVO explained that: 
If you look at all risk factors, we are just sitting on powder keg. In the past, animal disease 
control and response was ‘perfect’, there was effective quarantine, restricted animal 
movement, but now there is nothing. I can assure you if RVF occurs today, it will still kill people 
and livestock. We are always reactive. 
(Personal communication, 6 Sept 2013) 
While the suggestion that there once was a previous ‘golden age’ of perfection may be implausible, 
the DVO’s comments indicate that there are serious weaknesses in the enforcement of movement 
restrictions, despite both the scientists and pastoralists acknowledging that it is one way of controlling 
the spread of RVF. 
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12. What do pastoralists know about RVF? 
Although there are a number of diseases that may be diagnostically confused with RVF, most of the 
sample of pastoralists with whom we worked could articulate the symptoms by reference to which 
they would diagnose RVF in their livestock or communities, and by which they differentiate it from 
other infectious zoonoses. Our data were collected in 2013, which was some five years after the last 
officially reported outbreak of RVF in Kenya. Recollections of the last outbreak of RVF undoubtedly 
informed their knowledge and beliefs. Pastoralists explained that the most distinctive symptom of RVF 
is nose bleeding, in livestock and people (as well as abortions in pregnant females), while the other 
symptoms are characteristic of many different fevers. Our findings therefore reinforce the account 
provided by ILRI in 2008 and 2010. (ILRI and DVS 2008; Jost et al. 2010). 
During and after the 2006/7 outbreak of RVF many local NGOs, official bodies and international 
organisations invested in providing RVF training and awareness raising to veterinary and public health 
staff and to pastoralists in some of the worst affected areas. It is difficult to estimate the impact of 
those efforts, but when our data were collected in 2013 pastoralists were relatively well-informed 
about RVF. In particular they knew enough to be able to contribute effectively to disease surveillance. 
In 2008 ILRI reported that. ‘Herders recognise that outbreaks [of RVF] are associated with large black 
and white mosquitoes […] as opposed to, for example, the smaller mosquitoes associated with malaria’ 
(ILRI and DVS 2008). In our study, pastoralists explained that they recognise that ‘dotted’ mosquitoes 
as those that are most likely to carry RVF. They were also aware that moving animals can spread the 
infection, as is the case with other infectious diseases.  
There is evidence of cultural and religious differences in practices concerning eating meat across 
diverse groups and regions. Cultural and religious taboos against eating meat from sick animals, to 
which Muslims subscribe, are perceived as a measure that can protect against zoonotic diseases such 
as RVF. Pastoralists in the Ijara district articulated diligent conformity with the rule of never eating the 
meat of ‘fallen’ stock, irrespective of the cause of their death. A pastoralist in Ijara district explained, 
‘We Muslims don’t butcher dead animals. When we feel like eating an animal, we slaughter and 
butcher a healthy one at home.’ They say that when they suspect one of their animals has succumbed 
to RVF, they bury the corpse quite deeply and in a safe location, for example away from water courses. 
The pastoralists also have some traditional methods for reducing exposure to biting insects, such as 
enclosing their livestock overnight, if only with rudimentary barriers, and setting fires downwind to 
use the smoke, especially with material from acacia trees, to repel insects. When RVF erupted, they 
tried using their traditional remedies in the form of herbal ointments on fevered animals, but 
subsequently reported that they found those remedies to be ineffective. 
Pastoralists in Ijara district explained that, in the face of the challenges posed by RVF, they do look to 
the Kenyan Government and its local official representatives for help. Their experience of the 2006/7 
outbreak was that they had been provided with information and advice by veterinary and public health 
officials and from Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs). More recently however there have 
been pressures from professional veterinary organisations to persuade the government to rely more 
on professionals and less on CAHWs.   
During the 2007 outbreak CAHWs were recruited to assist with the vaccination programme but, once 
the outbreak subsided, CAHWs were increasingly marginalised and ignored. The evidence gathered for 
this study indicates that CAHWs are predominantly volunteers who often receive no official support, 
and while their services might be called upon in the event of a fresh outbreak of RVF, they would then 
require re-training as well as, for example, supplies and allowances.   
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Representative of professional veterinarians have argued that farmers should benefit from the services 
of trained professionals rather than poorly trained or equipped CAHWs. Some veterinarians evidently 
consider CAHWs as competitors who undercut their prices while providing inferior services. On the 
other hand pastoralists, especially nomadic ones, see professional veterinarians as scarce and 
prohibitively expensive. If professional veterinarians had greater incentives to train, equip and 
supervise CAHWs, pastoralists’ communities might obtain enhanced veterinary support that would be 
accessible and affordable to prevent and/or manage diseases. Such changes could also enable DVOs 
to gather and share larger and more reliable sets of data. This scenario implies institutional changes, 
based on a One Health concept, to enhance capacities to mitigate and respond to outbreaks of 
zoonoses. 
Recently-settled communities of sedentary agro-pastoralists located in the Tana River District, 
especially those who are able to farm on irrigated land, have mostly come from arable farming 
communities, and so have less experience of livestock than traditional mobile pastoralists. The 
evidence indicates that they are often less well-informed about RVF than the pastoralists in Ijara 
district, they had scant knowledge of the symptoms of RVF or how to respond to an outbreak. They 
are far more dependent on veterinary expertise and services than are their more mobile and 
experienced counterparts. 
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13. Local innovations 
Within pastoralist communities, there have been some ‘grassroots innovations’ as members of those 
communities have experimented, learnt and modified their practices to try to diminish the harm RVF 
can cause. In several small settlements, where local pastoralists bring their livestock for sale and 
slaughter, changes have been introduced to the design, layout and practices at the site of slaughter.  
Pastoralists and others, such as veterinarians and laboratory workers, realised that they were amongst 
the groups with the highest incidence of RVF, consequently pastoralists were as keen on finding ways 
to diminish the risks that RVF posed to them as were the professionals.  
13.1. Innovative slaughter facilities and practices 
Traditionally in the Ijara district, individual pastoralist households would slaughter and butcher their 
own animals. During the most recent outbreak of RVF, pastoralists realised however that if they 
relocated their slaughtering to shared facilities that were better-designed and equipped than their 
domestic facilities they could, with suitable training, significantly reduce their risks of exposure to RVF.  
Several such slaughter facilities were built after the 2007 outbreak in Ijara district. They were 
configured to diminish the risks to those working in the facility, who were also equipped with, for 
example, protective gloves and trained in safe use of the new facilities. They changed the ways in which 
they handling the animals before slaughter, as well as ways of handling carcasses, meat and waste, 
thus avoiding exposure to high levels of infectivity. Those innovations were encouraged by the local 
veterinary officers and other local officials, who also have responsibility for licensing suitable facilities. 
While several individuals took initiatives to invest in those new facilities, they did so on concessionary 
terms. In some localities, the communities refunded the butchers’ investments and adopted forms of 
collective ownership of the facility, where the butchers remain as custodians and service providers. In 
others they paid for the service at, for example, a rate of 20 KSh per shoat, and 100 KSh for cattle and 
camels. More recently however the use of protective gloves has apparently diminished. 
13.2. New water sources 
Innovations around water pans were also introduced. Water sources have long been key locations for 
human-wildlife-livestock interactions. There have, moreover, been more frequent and closer 
interactions between wildlife and agricultural livestock during dry periods, especially in fall-back 
grazing areas. The grazing areas and watering points are, however, themselves also changing. The 
number of water sources and the amounts of water available have also declined due to environmental 
changes and increased numbers of livestock. 
In the 2006/07 outbreak RVF did not affect wildlife as much as it infected livestock. A Kenya Wildlife 
Service (KWS) Warden explained that wildlife populations in the Ijara district had previously been 
increasing. In areas with sufficient pasture and water, such as the Boni forest, there are frequent 
interactions between people, livestock and wildlife, which were problematic once an RVF outbreak 
began. To address this problem, several water pans were constructed away from Boni forest. The 
Warden explained that, ‘ […] fewer water pans lead to congregation of livestock, wildlife and humans 
at water points. As a result of this interaction, it was possible for RVF to spread with ease’ (Personal 
communication, KWS Warden, September 2013). 
Donor and aid organisations, such as World Vision, endeavoured to improve the livelihoods of 
pastoralists by constructing separate water pans for humans and for livestock, or in some locations 
water pans for animal use and boreholes for human water use, to diminish the risks of cross-infection 
(Personal communication, KWS Warden, September 2013). 
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14. The Kenyan Government’s Contingency Plan for RVF: how 
it came to be created and what is proposed 
The clearest and most comprehensive statement of the Kenyan Government’s policy in respect of RVF 
emerged in April 2010 from the DVS, which is located in the Ministry of Livestock Development (MLD).  
It was entitled, Contingency Plan for Rift Valley Fever, and it is referred to in this document as the RVF 
CP (MLD 2010). Shortly after publication, it was officially adopted by the Government of Kenya. Its 
creation can be understood in large part as a reaction to the 2006/2007 outbreak of RVF.  
Two years later, in 2012, the Kenyan Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation issued a document 
concerning surveillance of infectious diseases entitled Technical Guidelines for Integrated Disease 
Surveillance and Response in Kenya. Those guidelines had previously been drafted in October 2010 by 
the WHO Regional Office for Africa (AFRO) and the CDC, and then adapted by the Kenyan Ministry of 
Public Health and Sanitation in 2012.5 One noticeable feature of that document is that it made no 
mention whatsoever of pastoralists, and referred to farmers only as groups upon whom surveillance 
should be conducted. It provided no evidence that the Ministry recognised that effective disease 
surveillance and response cannot be accomplished without the active participation of groups such as 
farmers and pastoralists. 
The RVF CP’s characteristics also drew on the 2002 UN FAO document entitled Preparation of Rift 
Valley Fever Contingency Plans (FAO 2002). In March 2008 another influential contribution emerged 
jointly from the DVS and ILRI, reporting the findings of a study funded by USAID that sought to identify 
lessons from the 2006/7 outbreak. It recommended that: 
The Department of Veterinary Services and the Ministry of Health should work together to 
develop a contingency plan based on cost-benefit assessments of interventions and 
practicality. A contingency plan should address strategy, actors, command chain, coordination 
and collaboration, and the optimal use of resources. 
(ILRI and DVS 2008) 
It is puzzling therefore that the RVF CP emerged from the DVS with no conspicuous contribution from 
the Ministry of Health. 
The March 2008 ILRI document reported that its: 
[…] participatory epidemiologic study found that livestock owners could clearly identify the 
clinical signs and risk factors associated with RVF, and distinguish RVF from other livestock 
diseases. Livestock owners are a key information source for RVF early warning and early 
detection. Herders recognize RVF based on clinical symptoms, and 12 of 17 groups interviewed 
recognised the 2006/2007 outbreak as being the same disease as that which occurred in 
1996/97 
(ILRI and DVS 2008) 
In other words, pastoralists were, understandably, being cast in the role of information providers. The 
RVF CP was, on the other hand, less clear about what the pastoralists could expect to receive in return 
for their contributions to disease surveillance. It is also notable that the expression ‘livestock owners’ 
                                                          
5 See http://1.usa.gov/1x10jy8  
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was used in a way that failed to acknowledge that not all owners are herders and not all herders are 
owners. While many poor pastoralists herd the livestock they own, there is a significant but influential 
minority of urban owners who employ others to tend their flocks and herds. In those cases the animal 
herders may know far more about the livestock than do their owners.    
While Appendix 1 of ILRI’s 2008 Report recommended enhanced collaboration between the DVS and 
the Ministry of Health, and recommended enhancing the roles of CAHWs, it also stated:  
Most of the participants interviewed indicated that the first cases of RVF were not reported 
because the livestock owners were unaware of the outbreak. Moreover, they indicated that 
cases are often reported when they fail to respond to their treatments. 
(ILRI 2008) 
The authors also recognised that:  
Livestock owners would only participate in the surveillance system if they can benefit from it.  
This could be through improved delivery of veterinary services by strengthening the roles of 
CAHWs especially in areas where the DVS is thinly spread through focussed trainings. The 
CAHWs would then play a role of linking the livestock owners with the DVS. 
(ILRI 2008: 29) 
Those remarks are important because they show that some contributors to the deliberations, upon 
which the ILRI Report was based, appreciated that pastoralists would be far more likely to contribute 
to RVF surveillance for the DVS if there were incentives for them to do so. If reporting suspected cases 
of RVF entails the imposition of local movement controls, compulsory vaccinations and bans on the 
export of livestock from East Africa to lucrative markets in the Middle East then it is understandable 
why pastoralists might hesitate before reporting their earliest suspicions, and why they might be 
reluctant to comply fully with subsequent movement restrictions. 
The 2008 ILRI Report asserted that:  
The lack of an effective surveillance system and preparedness plan – acknowledged by virtually 
all contacted key informants and participants of the stakeholder workshop – needs to be 
translated in a national contingency plan that ensures timely decision-making and allows for a 
rapid response to future outbreaks. The line ministries will need to consult key partners of 
provincial administration and communities, international organizations, NGOs active in rural 
development and health, funding agencies and research to identify and describe the most 
efficient and equitable prevention and control measures. There will not be one best option but 
rather interplay between different measures that are appropriate from early detection to 
avoidance of disease in people. 
(ILRI 2008: 8) 
One month after the emergence from ILRI of Learning the Lessons of Rift Valley Fever, the RVF CP was 
published. The RVF CP was prepared by MLD’s DVS, but with support from the FAO and USAID and by 
specialists working at the Nairobi-based offices of the International Livestock Research Institute (MLD 
2010). 
The RVF CP envisaged a sequence of four decision points or stages for action mainly, but not entirely, 
by central government organisations.  
In this contingency plan key decision points have been identified, subdivided into normal, 
prediction (investigation and alert), outbreak (operational) and step-down phases. Key 
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activities during the normal phase include capacity building, disease surveillance, developing 
early warning systems (sentinel herds and climatic monitoring) and building livestock 
immunity through mass annual vaccinations in high risk areas. Early warning systems that will 
be set in the normal phase will enable accurate prediction of a potential disease outbreak at 
which point implementation measures will be taken. In addition, mosquito surveillance and 
control will be critical especially when heavy and prolonged rains result in flooding. Once the 
outbreak occurs in animals, measures will be geared towards preventing human infections 
through animal movement restrictions, closure of livestock markets and slaughter bans.  
(MLD 2010: Executive Summary, 4 (emphases added)) 
Subsequently, it emerged that the capacities envisaged for development during the normal phase 
would be ones that should serve to deal, not just with RVF, but also with the entire range of zoonotic 
infections of livestock. That in part might account for relatively high estimated cost of those 
preparations (MLD 2010: 48–49 and 59–60). Nonetheless there is very little evidence that capacities 
for active surveillance and effective outbreak control have yet been created, mainly because resources 
required have yet to be allocated, let alone invested.  
The normal phase was also planned to include, ‘building livestock immunity through mass annual 
vaccinations in high risk areas’, but that has not happened. It is not even clear that even if the Kenyan 
Government or donors were to invest in sufficient doses of annual (i.e. inactivated) vaccine, there 
would be sufficient staff to deliver the vaccinations and keep reliable records, or a sufficiently high 
level of cooperation on the part of the pastoralists, for herd immunity to be achieved, without which 
outbreaks cannot be prevented from spreading. 
The RVF CP also assumed that by the time the next outbreak emerges, it will be possible to provide 
sufficiently reliably and accurate early warnings of critical meteorological changes, but at the time of 
writing, October 2014, that was not yet possible, and may even be a remote possibility. It is not that 
computer models cannot be built, the problem is rather that many different equally plausible 
computerised models can accommodate historical data and yet provide conflicting forecasts. In the 
event of an outbreak the RVF CP also envisages, ‘measures […] geared towards preventing human 
infections through animal movement restrictions, closure of livestock markets and slaughter bans’ 
(MLD 2010: 4). Effectively controlling animal movements would, however, also be difficult.   
The document continues: 
To mitigate potential socio-economic impacts of a future outbreak, it is important that 
measures for preparedness during the normal phase are taken seriously, as little can be done 
once an outbreak occurs. Enhancing the response capacity of veterinary services as spelt out 
in the resource plans in this contingency plan will be critical. Financing of RVF prevention and 
control requires an increased budgetary allocation during normal times while some emergency 
funds will be set aside through the Veterinary Services Development Fund. This will assist 
implementation of heightened measures at prediction phase while awaiting access for 
contingency funds from treasury once the chance of an outbreak is very likely. In addition to 
finances this contingency plan highlights the gaps in technical personnel capacity which will be 
addressed during the normal phase. 
(MLD 2010: 4) 
The RVF CP is right in that once an outbreak begins, there is little that can then be done to stop it from 
spreading, and prior investments in capacity-building will be crucial. The pastoralists, with whom we 
worked, emphasised that RVF typically erupts at times of flooding, but that is precisely when road 
transport becomes exceptionally challenging. If relevant resources and skills are not in place at the 
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start of an outbreak, they will be very difficult to deliver when and where they will be needed. It is 
important to note therefore that, as of October 2014, i.e. more than four years from the publication 
of the RVF CP, there is no evidence that the necessary resources have been allocated or that 
preparedness has been significantly enhanced.   
While the Ministry of Livestock did establish its Veterinary Services Development Fund (VSDF), which 
gained revenue for meat inspection services to the livestock and slaughterhouse trades, the size of 
that fund is dwarfed by the magnitude of the task of preparing for RVF and other threatening zoonoses.  
No explanations for the lack of investment have been provided by official bodies, but their reasons 
may well have included competing demands on limited resources and the anticipated up-front costs.  
Moreover, given that during the 2006/07 outbreak, some resources were eventually provided by 
international donors, there might be some concern that early domestic investments might diminish 
the impact of subsequent calls for urgent aid. McSherry et al. have, though, characterised the Kenyan 
Ministry of Livestock Development as marginal and weak (McSherry et al. 2007: 9). 
The RVF CP was framed from a conspicuously top-down perspective, which was understandable given 
that it had been based on an FAO template. The focus was on the responsibilities of government 
departments and officials. It was almost entirely a plan for what the Government should do. It did, 
towards the end, refer to rural communities, but only at the bottom of its ‘tree’ and only in terms of, 
‘Community based animal disease surveillance and response groups’, under the leadership of, ‘Chiefs 
and their assistants, Community leaders, departmental animal health staff’ (MLD 2010: 40). 
During the 2006/07 RVF outbreak, contingency teams were formed. They were called Disaster Rapid 
Response Teams and drew, for example, on the local representatives from the Ministry of Health, the 
Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), the District Veterinary Office and a representative of District 
Commissioner. Some resources were mobilised and the teams trained. The Ijara team was reportedly 
re-trained in 2012. It is difficult to estimate how long it could take to re-establish such arrangements 
in the event of future outbreaks, but in the absence of a serious and widespread outbreak of RVF few 
preparations could be discerned. Evidence gathered during our project suggested that even some 
District Veterinary Officers had little familiarity with the RVF CP, if any. 
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15. The RVF Contingency Plan from the pastoralists’ 
perspective 
While there is no evidence that the vast majority of pastoralists have any awareness of the existence, 
let alone the content, of the RVF CP, it remains important to ask how the plan intersects with their 
perspectives. The RVF CP contains many provisions, for example on capacity-building and resource 
provision that, if delivered, would be beneficial for, and welcomed by, pastoralists. On the other hand, 
from the pastoralists’ perspective, even if the plan was adequately resourced, it would nonetheless 
remain imperfect and incomplete. Some of those imperfections are technological, while others are 
socio-economic. 
When asked, the pastoralists with whom we worked had other priorities and criteria of appraisal of 
plans to deal with risks from zoonotic diseases. They explained that the most serious challenge they 
face comes from climate change and the consequent growing unreliability of water and pasture. The 
challenge they ranked second most important was the threat to their physical security from aggressive 
heavily-armed groups. Diseases of livestock, and consequent risks to their health and livelihoods were 
ranked third, but of those zoonotic infections RVF came third, behind brucellosis and foot and mouth 
disease. The RVF CP frames RVF as essentially veterinary and public health problems, while for the 
pastoralists it is a massive threat to their entire livelihoods – it is not just a challenge to veterinary and 
public health.  
The attitude of the RVF CP, which is implicit in the document’s wording, towards the pastoralists, who 
are those most vulnerable to RVF, is that the active assistance of pastoralists should ensure that they 
are actively alert to, and promptly report, the earliest signs of an outbreak of RVF. Beyond that, the 
RVF CP casts pastoralists in the roles of compliant and obedient citizens, ready and willing to 
implement any and all instructions and advice provided by officialdom. There is nothing in the text to 
suggest that the pastoralists might not entirely trust officialdom, and may even have incentives to 
delay (or even refuse) compliance and to ignore or discount some of the official advice and instructions.  
One problem with the perspective implicit in the RVF CP is that there is little prospect of the pastoralists 
being provided with much in exchange for the surveillance data they are supposed to deliver. Even 
when samples have been taken from fallen stock, surviving herds and human tissue by local veterinary 
and/or public health officials, the results obtained in subsequent laboratory tests were never reported 
back to the people from whom they have been gathered. There has not even been that minimal degree 
of reciprocity. If, for example, the results of those tests had been shared with those from whom they 
were gathered, it would have enhanced their ability to distinguish cases of RVF from other viral fevers. 
They could consequently become more sensitive and reliable in their disease surveillance and 
diagnoses. If reciprocity between pastoralists and officialdom were to be enhanced, by measures of 
that sort amongst others, then information could be expected to flow more freely, rapidly and reliably, 
and higher levels of compliance and implementation might be anticipated.   
Reciprocal obligations between the government and the pastoralists, in exchange for better 
information and enhanced co-operation, could extend to some form of publicly supported insurance 
and/or compensation scheme for victims of outbreaks of RVF. Under those conditions, the pastoralists’ 
incentive structure would be significantly transformed. Instead the RVF CP characterises the terms of 
reference for District Disease Control Committees as, ‘[…] to galvanize local support and public 
compliance with the control measures as well as to coordinate epizootic mitigation measures’ (MLD 
2010: 41). 
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Another important omission concerns the contributions that CAHWs could provide. If, as the RVF CP 
envisages, capacities to respond effectively to outbreaks of RVF are to be built at the local level, then 
that could be far more readily accomplished with enthusiastic contributions from CAHWs than could 
be the case without them. Nonetheless the RVF CP fails to refer to CAHWs. From the pastoralists’ 
perspective, that would be a puzzling omission. Our fieldwork indicated that CAHWs can play an 
important role in bridging between officials working for the Veterinary and Livestock Services and the 
pastoralists. The pastoralists explained that CAHWs are especially helpful in the event of emergencies, 
but once those emergencies are over they are ignored by the official system. Not only do they receive 
no resources, they are not even provided with relevant information. Consequently if there is to be 
sustained active surveillance for diseases such as RVF and prophylactic vaccination programmes, then 
there could be an important big role for CAHWs, and one about which local veterinary officials were 
enthusiastic.   
While the links between the national authorities on the one hand and their local representatives and 
the pastoralists on the other may be weak, there are corresponding weakness in the links between 
those responsible for veterinary health and those responsible for public health. It would be premature 
to suggest that Kenyan Government policy-making on zoonotic infections such as RVF has become 
sufficiently integrated that it could be labelled as embodying a ‘one-health’ approach. The RVF CP was 
prepared by the Department of Veterinary Services, without any evident input from the health ministry.  
Since then, while the ZDU has been the established, and the Ministry of Health has prepared a 
document entitled Guidelines for Rift Valley Fever Preparedness and Response, there remain significant 
differences between the Ministry of Health and experts at ILRI concerning the potential impacts of a 
vaccination strategy to combat RVF. There is also scant evidence of improved communication between 
professional groups with distinct types of expertise, or between the central government and either 
local officials or representatives of pastoralist communities. 
In 2008 ILRI reported that:  
The comparison between resource capacity, tasks and constraints between [public and 
veterinary health] sectors showed that the ratio of deployed staff was 1 livestock staff to 5 
public health staff - the veterinary services were understaffed to fulfil the broad range of 
assigned tasks […] The calculated costs of allowances in two Provinces alone were higher than 
the amount that has been immediately mobilised by the veterinary services for all affected 
districts. 
(ILRI and DVS 2008: 5)   
The same report also stated that. ‘There is a disparity in resource allocations between the different 
public sectors. Veterinary resources cannot adequately match those that can be mobilized by health’ 
(ILRI and DVS 2008: 7). Given the centrality of the health of their livestock to the livelihoods of 
pastoralists, it is evident that pastoralists would be amongst those who could benefit most from 
increased support for veterinary services, especially if they were provided by trained qualified 
professionals working in collaboration with Community Animal Health Workers.  
As Butcher et al. have argued:  
Traversing borders and boundaries, RVF could wreak devastating outcomes once more unless 
stringent local and regional public health collaborations are established. It is therefore 
necessary to empower livestock owners and instate them in national and regional early 
detection, as part of a strengthened detection and response mechanism. 
(Butcher et al. 2012)  
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16. The implications of Kenya’s new constitution 
The RVF CP was published before Kenya’s new Constitution was adopted, but the restructuring of 
Kenyan domestic governance entailed by the adoption and implementation of this Constitution, will 
have implications for how the re-allocation of responsibilities might impact on plans to deal with 
diseases such as RVF.6 
In principle, the emergence of the RVF CP and the provisions of the new 2010 Constitution could create 
some opportunities for local perspectives to contribute to and enrich the RVF CP and increase the 
prospects of it being implementable. On the other hand, it is officially expected to take until 2017 fully 
to implement the new Constitution, so how those developments will unfold cannot yet be reliably 
predicted.  
A key feature of the new Constitution is that it envisages the devolution of many powers from central 
government to the newly established Counties. In 2008, ILRI had argued that devolving powers to deal 
with RVF to local communities would be beneficial. ILRI argued that:  
Decision making power should be entrusted at the appropriate level so that early prevention 
and control actions are possible. In the case of RVF in Kenya, the authority of local level 
decision makers in the districts to declare and take actions to control a potential RVF outbreak 
based on local early warning indicators […] needs to be recognized. 
(ILRI and DVS 2008: 6–7) 
Under the new dispensation, 47 newly designated Counties will replace the Provinces (which are being 
abolished) and the Districts. The location and control of borders between local jurisdictions are 
important, because movement restrictions in the event of an outbreak of RVF were on traffic across 
District borders, during the 2006/07 outbreaks permits were not required to move livestock within 
Districts. 
With the Counties in place, it is not clear who will be mandated to deal with veterinary services and 
disease control. As was recently seen in Bomet County during an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease, 
the County Governor publicly announced closure of markets after an FMD outbreak, saying it would 
help to restrict livestock movements and reduce the spread of the disease:  
As the county government we bought vaccination medicine and our agriculture staff will carry 
out the exercise in the two constituencies at a subsidized fee from the normal rates […] We 
are not leaving out the other constituencies in the County but as a control measure we opted 
to start in the two constituencies due to its prevalence before extending the service to the 
other constituencies. 
(Kimutai 2013)   
This raised debates concerning the division of responsibilities for disease control, under the new 
Constitution, between the County governments and the Directorate of Veterinary Services. It remains 
to be seen in which authority responsibility to impose movement restrictions on livestock will be 
located. In any case however, local areas that are deemed disease free will be keen to ensure that their 
status can be sustained. In the autumn of 2014 the Directorate of Veterinary Services of The Ministry 
                                                          
6 See https://www.kenyaembassy.com/pdfs/The%20Constitution%20of%20Kenya.pdf 
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of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries prepared a set of Standard Operating Procedures covering for 
example Livestock Vaccination Against RVF, Quarantine Measures for the Control of RVF, and for 
Surveillance of Animal Diseases, both passive and active (DVS 2014a; DVS 2014b; DVS 2014c: DVS 
2014d; DVS 2014e). A conspicuous feature of those documents is that they attributed to Country-level 
authorities numerous responsibilities for setting and enforcing control measures but without any 
indication that resources would be made available to the counties to enable them effectively to meet 
those responsibilities. 
It is quite possible that some Counties may choose to allocate resources to preparations for meeting 
the challenges of RVF, but it is too soon to tell. Some in central government assume that they will 
provide advice while the Counties would be expected to allocate funds and implement actions. But it 
remains to be seen whether the counties will perceive someone from outside the County as an 
interfering outsider. As the allocation of revenues between districts is, at the time of writing, not yet 
settled, it is too soon to estimate the impact of the New Constitution on preparations for outbreaks of 
RVF, and other zoonotic diseases. On the other hand, leaving all plans and responsibilities unchanged 
seems the least likely outcome.  
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17. Summary of findings and conclusions 
The overarching objective of this project has been to provide an evidence-based analysis of some of 
the conditions under which the risks posed to Kenya by RVF might be diminished. The foregoing 
sections provided a review of the evidence we gathered, and this section highlights some conclusions 
concerning those conditions. 
Building an adequate and sustainable human and animal health infrastructure in Kenya that could 
effectively diminish the harm RVF causes will not be a simple task. The infrastructure would need to 
include vital components such as risk analysis and preparedness, disease surveillance, enhanced 
diagnostic capacities, and a range of effective precautions, as well as a set of measures than can be 
implemented and enforced to control outbreaks. It would also benefit from research and 
development, all of which will require investing financial resources, which should be used to enhance 
levels of human capital in scientific and pastoralist communities. 
RVF prevention and control measures in Kenya will, nonetheless, be selected and implemented in a 
context in which the Government of Kenya does not have large amounts of spare money, and faces 
numerous diverse and competing calls on its scarce resources. The more persuasive arguments can be 
that the more investments in, for example, disease surveillance, enhanced diagnostic capabilities and 
outbreak controls can be seen as cost-effective, the more likely they are to be funded. It would appear 
that the arguments in the 2010 RVF CP were insufficiently persuasive. 
An effective set of measures to diminish the risks posed by RVF to Kenya will require fostering 
collaborations amongst, for example, public health and veterinary professionals and between 
professionals on the one hand and community workers and representatives on the other. There may 
also be scope for improved co-operation between public and private sectors, for example in relation 
to the manufacture of vaccines and stock-holding.   
The design for an improved RVF response system in Kenya therefore needs to take account of 
virological, epidemiological, meteorological, economic and socio-cultural considerations, A low level 
rate of investment in resources almost certainly imposes restrictions on the extent and viability of 
vaccination initiatives, not only due to the technical characteristics and costs of vaccines, but also 
because of the logistical and infrastructural requirements needed to deliver acceptable and effective 
outcomes. 
There is also scope for improved collaboration and planning for RVF outbreaks between the 
Government of Kenya and aid and development agencies, for example in relation to research and 
development. One priority should be research and development (R&D) aimed at improving the 
efficacy, safety and durability of RVF vaccines. There may also be some scope for Kenyan authorities 
to request resource support from more affluent countries in the Arabian Peninsula, which normally 
rely on importing livestock from East Africa. A collective approach from East African countries to 
affluent Middle Eastern and Arabian States, which import livestock from the countries in the Horn of 
Africa, to support RVF control programmes might be appropriate. If for example Middle Eastern and 
Arabian States helped provide a sustained programme of preventative vaccination of vulnerable 
livestock in the Horn of Africa, they could consequently anticipate uninterrupted meat supplies and 
domestic price stability. 
Policy development regarding RVF responses in Kenya could benefit from engaging more effectively 
with pastoralists’ and farmers’ knowledge, beliefs and interests and the characteristics of the broader 
socio-cultural and ecological contexts in which they live. Any effective RVF response needs to be 
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tailored to local situations. To maximise the likely success of RVF control options, effective 
coordination will be critical, alongside adequate infrastructure, trained personnel nationally and locally 
with effective enforcement of the regulations. 
The incentives for pastoralists to report an RVF outbreak, whether economic, cultural, or political, 
affect whether and when a zoonotic disease outbreak is officially recognised. Both scientific experts 
and pastoralists know some RVF symptoms and risk factors, as well as measures that can help control 
the disease. Without active surveillance of sentinel herds in vulnerable areas for RVF infections and 
prompt reporting of RVF outbreaks, in settings where local communities have limited diagnostic skills 
and weak incentives to report outbreaks or suspicions, efforts to prevent the rapid spread of RVF are 
unlikely to be successful.   
Quality disease surveillance and reporting goes beyond just a confirmation or denial. In order to 
respond effectively, policymakers will need clear assessments of developments, based on reliable 
information. There remain however several uncertainties and gaps in knowledge about RVF outbreaks 
and their persistence. Several gaps in knowledge have been identified, which have not been explored 
to date. Given the unpredictability of virus dispersion and uncertainties about RVF epidemiology, there 
is a need to fill the scientific gaps by developing targeted agendas for RVF research and development.  
Aid agencies and donors have a role to play in supporting vital R&D efforts. 
The Kenyan Government’s 2010 Contingency Plan for RVF contained many promising provisions, but it 
is in several important respects incomplete. Much of that incompleteness arose as a consequence of 
failing to engage adequately with the perspectives of the pastoralists, who are those at greatest risk 
from RVF. Moreover, the Government of Kenya has yet to show a willingness to allocate the resources 
necessary to equip the veterinary, public health and local administrative officials to implement key 
elements of the plan. Effective solutions will require high levels of local co-operation between those 
stakeholder groups, with financial and practical support from central government. 
There is insufficient clarity as to the precise conditions under which the Kenyan Government would 
declare an official outbreak of RVF. The implications for the domestic livestock and meat trade are 
substantial, and the impact on the export trade may also be important. How many cases of RVF, judged 
by reference to which kinds of epidemiological data and to which kinds of laboratory-based 
confirmation, would be deemed necessary and/or sufficient for an outbreak to be declared, have yet 
to be officially clarified. If decisions in those regards have been taken but not published, the lack of 
clarity is unhelpful. On the other hand, no decisions may have yet been taken to set those benchmarks, 
but in midst of an incipient outbreak, taking such decisions in stressful conditions would be particularly 
difficult.  
Given that initiatives to vaccinate vulnerable livestock may be beneficial, even though supplies of 
vaccines are inadequate, one option might be to use the available stock to vaccinate the most 
vulnerable livestock in the high risk areas to try to achieve some local herd immunity, which might 
inhibit the spread of RVF to other areas. That option will, however, only be able to be implemented if 
sufficient stocks of viable vaccines are in store in suitable facilities in key locations, from which they 
can be effectively distributed and administered. 
While national, regional and local capacities need to be enhanced and co-ordinated, the costs of doing 
so remain difficult to estimate, as do the potential costs of failing to implement an effective plan. An 
effective plan could only be implemented if there were enhanced reciprocal flows of information 
between national and local officials, in both veterinary and public health areas, and between officials 
and local communities. If those conditions were satisfied the chances of effective and speedy 
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responses to early warnings of an outbreak of RVF would be enhanced and the resultant costs 
diminished. 
If policy-makers and public officials were to engage more effectively with the perspectives of 
pastoralists, they would recognise that pastoralists have incentives and some means to innovate.  
Providing them with resources and incentives to do so, and showing willingness to adapt their plans to 
take account of such innovations, would almost certainly be beneficial to all groups.   
Significant benefits could be derived from establishing and supporting Community-Based Early 
Warning Systems, and if CAHWs and other local stakeholders received official support. Enhancing the 
resources for, and responsibilities of, CAHWs, perhaps under the supervision of professional 
veterinarians, could enable Kenyans to improve their ability to withstand the challenges posed by 
zoonotic infections such as RVF. CAHWs might themselves contribute innovatively and facilitate 
learning and innovating on the part of their pastoralist communities. 
Professional veterinarians often maintain that farmers should benefit from the services of trained 
professionals rather than poorly trained or equipped CAHWs. Some veterinarians consider CAHWs as 
competitors who undercut their prices while providing inferior services. On the other hand pastoralists, 
especially nomadic ones, see vets as scarce and prohibitively expensive. If professional vets had greater 
incentives to train, equip and supervise CAHWs, pastoralists communities might obtain enhanced 
veterinary support that would be accessible and affordable to prevent and/or manage diseases. Such 
changes could also enable District Veterinary Officers to capture and share larger and more reliable 
sets of data. This scenario implies institutional changes, based on a One Health concept, to enhance 
capacities to mitigate and respond to outbreaks of zoonoses.  
The ability of Kenyans and other East Africans to withstand the challenges of diseases such as RVF 
could be substantially improved if investments were made into research and development of, for 
example, suitable vaccines. Thermo-stable vaccines that could be stored, transported and 
administered at ambient temperatures would be remarkably helpful. If vaccines could be developed 
that could provide sustained protection, without regular re-inoculation, and which did not threaten 
adverse reactions such as spontaneous miscarriages, they would be enthusiastically welcomed by 
pastoralists and settled livestock farmers alike. Science-based innovations may therefore have a lot to 
contribute, but mutually reinforcing innovations as between farmers and scientists could be even more 
beneficial, although no immediate prospect of their emergence in Kenya could be discerned. 
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